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Abstract— With the advancement in virtualization 
technology, virtual machines (VMs) are becoming a 
common and integral part of datacenters. As the 
popularity and the use of VMs increases, incidents 
involving them are also on the rise. There is 
substantial research on using VMs and virtual 
appliances to aid forensic investigation, but research 
on the appropriate forensics procedures for collecting 
and analyzing evidence within a VM following is 
lacking. 
This paper presents a forensically sound way to 
acquire and analyze VM hard disks. A forensics tool 
for analyzing VM snapshots and vmdk files is 
developed and has been proven to be forensically 
sound.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, computer systems such as desktops and 
servers have been considered physical devices. With the 
introduction of virtualization in the IT industry, this may 
no longer be the case.  
With the benefits of virtualization, virtualization is 
becoming a widely adopted practice across organizations 
of various sizes [2, 13]. VMware is a popular provider of 
virtual machine (VM) software and holds a large share of 
the market. Products offered by VMware include 
VMware Workstation, VMware Server, and VMware 
ESXi among others. With the growing trend in 
virtualization, more and more production systems, 
workstations and desktops are being virtualized. Being a 
popular provider, VMware virtual environments are likely 
to be encountered by forensic investigators. To address 
the increase in exposure to VMs, this research will focus 
on acquisition and analysis of VMware products.  
VMware VMs are implemented using virtual adapters for 
devices such as network cards, memory, etc. The VM, 
however, is stored in a set of files. VMware Workstation 
creates files with extension like virtual machine 
configuration (.vmx), virtual hard drive (.vmdk), snapshot 
of the virtual machines’ memory  
(.vmem) etc [18]. The conventional methods for incident 
response and evidence acquisition - such as pulling the 
plug of a machine containing the VMs or suspending and 
resuming the VMs to gather evidence - may not be the 
best solution for forensic analysis of VMs since resuming 
a VM could potentially change both volatile and non-
volatile evidence leaving the evidence to be NOT 
admissible to court.  
In this paper, the authors propose a sound forensics 
methodology to acquire and analyze VMs hard disk 
evidence by utilizing the VMware artifact – the VM files. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
reviews the existing work performed in the area of 
forensic analysis of VMs. A forensically sound procedure 
to acquire and analyze virtual hard disks is presented in 
Section 3. The authors also present a forensics tool for 
analyzing VM snapshots and vmdk files and prove it to be 
forensically-sound in section 3. In Section 4, the authors 
evaluate the proposed forensic analysis tool. Section 5 
addresses the limitations of the proposed methodology. 
This paper is concluded in Section 6. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
According to Kruse & Heiser [11], the conventional 
forensic process can be broadly classified into four main 
phases, namely Acquire, Preserve, Analyze and Report. 
The acquisition state of the process involves capturing as 
much volatile system data as possible, then powering 
down the system and creating a forensic image of all the 
remaining non-volatile storage devices that are found [5]. 
A forensic image of a device is a bit-by-bit copy of the 
drive. The bit stream copy can be either stored as a file on 
  
another device or can directly be copied to another drive 
of similar or greater capacity. The bit stream copy of the 
storage drive is generally acquired using a dd based tool 
[15]. This image is stored in a raw format supported by a 
dd or a propriety format which is typically based on dd 
[16]. The acquired image is either an identical copy of the 
storage device, for example dd image, or the data from the 
device which is stored in a format that can be used to 
evaluate the contents and presented in court as 
permissible evidence. Analysis can be conducted using 
any of the many open-source or propriety tools available 
such as Sleuthkit [17], Forensics ToolKit [1], EnCase [9] 
etc. 
Most of the research conducted in the area of 
virtualization and forensics, makes use of VMs as 
forensics tools. VMs can be used to conduct analysis of 
evidence. VMs provide the examiner the ability to have a 
clean operating system without having to wipe a drive and 
install a fresh operating system on it for every new case. 
Helix [7] & Penguin Sleuth Kit Virtual Computer 
Forensics and Security Platforms [6] are popular Linux-
based operating systems tailored for forensics acquisition 
and analysis. Both platforms are readily available as 
virtual appliances that can be used with VMware 
products. Similarly other virtual appliances are available 
which use virtualization to assist in conducting a forensic 
investigation. 
Mrdovic et al. used a tool called Live View, which creates 
a VMware VM from a raw image of a drive or a physical 
drive [14]. Guo et al. use a similar process of using Live 
View to boot an image acquired by dd and use that to 
augment their static forensic methods [10]. This enables 
the investigator to boot up the disk in a virtual 
environment and gain an interactive, user-level 
perspective of the suspect’s environment. All this is done 
without modifying the image or the physical drive and is 
considered to be forensically sound. 
As incidents related to VMs are on the rise, they have 
caught the attention of forensics experts. New methods to 
collect evidence from VMs are needed. Fiterman and 
Durick in their article titled “Ghost in the Machine: 
Forensic Evidence Collection in the Virtual Environment” 
point out that tools and options that enable an examiner to 
investigate virtual data are currently limited [8]. Similar 
concerns regarding the absence of forensics tools and 
procedures for VM analysis are raised and methodologies 
are proposed by Beek [4]. He also suggests a tool which 
compares the memory files (.vmem) of snapshots created 
by VMware products for any new files or processes. 
Bares [2] in his research studied the amount of data that 
could be recovered from VMs in a NTFS partition. His 
research also showed that lesser amounts of data were 
recoverable if the VM was incorrectly shut down as 
compared to when it was shutdown gracefully. In this 
paper, we propose a solution that is able to acquire and 
analyze VM hard disk evidence on a running VM, without 
shutting down, in order to preserve the most evidence 
with the least number of modifications.  
In conclusion, there is abundant research on using VMs 
and virtual appliances to aid forensic investigation, but 
research on collecting and analyzing evidence from VMs 
hard disk is lacking. The proposed forensics methodology 
provides forensics examiners a forensics sound procedure 
and tool to acquire and analyze VMs hard disk images 
using only the existing VM files.  
 
3. FORENSICALLY-SOUND PROCEDURE FOR 
VIRTUAL DISK ACQUISITION AND ANALYSIS  
The use of VMs in corporate and personal environments 
is rapidly increasing; 18% of servers were virtualized in 
2009 and that grew to 25% in 2010. It is expected that by 
2012, about half of the servers hosted will be virtualized 
and hosted virtual desktops will reach 49 million units by 
2013 [13]. With the growing number of virtual systems it 
becomes imperative that a methodology to analyze virtual 
systems is developed. Many systems carry out critical 
tasks that cannot be stopped. If such systems are 
compromised, or are suspected of being compromised, 
they cannot be taken offline for analysis. In such a 
scenario it becomes important to conduct a live analysis 
of the system.  However, when a live analysis is carried 
out, the investigator may change information that resides 
in memory and any remaining open network connections 
will be terminated. According to Kurse & Heiser [11], the 
common practice to conduct forensic analysis of a 
physical machine is to take the machine offline at some 
point. The machine’s hard disk is then imaged, and its 
data acquired for analysis.  
When VMs are involved in an incident, the VM is usually 
suspended or a snapshot of the machine is created to 
preserve the processes and network status for forensics 
analysis. There are two paths that a forensics investigator 
can follow: a) resume the suspended VM and use the 
normal procedure to acquire and analyze the live 
machine, and b) analyze the VM files without resuming 
the suspended machine. However, the method of 
resuming a suspend VM before acquisition may 
  
potentially change the evidence, leading to the possibility 
that the evidence will NOT be legally admissible. 
In this section, the authors describe a forensics solution to 
acquire, preserve, and analyze snapshots of disk images 
using VM suspend or snapshot of VM files created by the 
VMware utility without resuming or shutting down VMs. 
 
3.1 Virtual Disk Acquisition  
The aim of forensic image acquisition is to minimize 
contamination and ensure legally-admissible evidence. To 
accomplish this, the digital evidence acquisition process 
has to follow an appropriate procedure.  Acquiring non-
volatile data from a physical hard disk entails many steps 
[11]. A machine is first powered off by disconnecting the 
power supply from the machine (i.e. pulling the plug). 
The hard disk is then removed from the suspect machine 
and connected to a forensic analysis machine. The hard 
disk is then imaged using any of the many tools available 
for imaging a disk such as dd, FTK Imager, EnCase, etc. 
This image is then used by a forensics investigator to 
conduct an analysis of the events the machine may have 
experienced. 
When working with suspended VMware images, there are 
two options for acquiring the virtual disks: resuming the 
suspended system, then use bit-by-bit copy or to directly 
work with the VMware .vmdk and snapshots files. The 
problem with resuming a VM is that during the resume 
process, many files stored on the hard disk are changed, 
which may destroy evidence. Another disadvantage of 
resuming the suspended VM is the loss of information 
stored in the memory as the state of the VM changes. 
Such information could be vital to the investigation being 
carried out. 
To overcome the shortcomings of resuming the suspended 
VM, the better solution is to create a snapshot of the VM 
and then work directly with the VM files that are stored 
on the host system. Upon taking a snapshot, the state of 
the hard disk is preserved and any changes to the disk are 
stored in a separate file. The virtual memory of the VM is 
stored in a file and any state changes are written to 
another virtual memory file. Following this procedure, we 
ensure that the evidence is preserved and can be presented 
to court as forensically sound and admissible evidence.  
Both EnCase and FTK support conversion of .vmdk files 
to raw (dd) format. When FTK is pointed to a snapshot 
for converting it to a raw image, it converts the snapshot 
along with any previous snapshots and the base vmdk 
files (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: FTK acquiring .vmdk in raw (dd) format. 
When EnCase is pointed to the base clean vmdk files, it 
successfully converts them to raw/dd format, but when 
EnCase is pointed to a later snapshot, it only converts the 
delta that is created after snapshoting a VM. As a result, 
to include the previous snapshots and the base images as 
well, one has to assimilate a flat vmdk file by using 
utilities that are packaged with VMware Workstation, 
namely vmware-vdiskmanager.exe. Vmware-
vdiskmanager.exe creates one vmdk file that includes: the 
selected snapshot, any previous snapshots and the base 
vmdk files. The resulting single vmdk file can then be 
converted to raw/dd format using EnCase (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: EnCase acquiring .vmdk in raw (dd) format. 
3.1.1 Forensically Sound Virtual Disk Acquisition  
It is now clear that both FTK and EnCase can acquire the 
contents of the virtual hard disk without shutting down 
the VM if a snapshot of this machine is created at the time 
of incident response. The next question is whether this 
solution is forensically sound. In other words, do FTK 
Imager and EnCase change the original VM disk image? 
In general, both FTK imager and EnCase require a 
write blocker device to image a live physical drive. 
However, since VMware virtual disks are implemented as 
files, can they be acquired without the use of a write 
  
blocker device using FTK and EnCase? In this 
experiment, the authors studied the functionality of both 
tools when applied to VM file conversion. In particular, 
the authors used both tools to create raw images for VM 
hard disks and calculated hashes of the raw images. We 
found that both tools produced the matching MD5 and 
SHA1 hashes, as can be seen from figures 3a & 3b. 
Therefore, we conclude that VM hard disk files can be 
safely converted to raw/dd images using either tool 
without relying on a write block device. 
 
Figure 3a: MD5 & SHA1 sums obtained from FTK 
Imager 
 
Figure 3b: MD5 & SHA1 sums obtained from EnCase 
3.1.2 Guest System Time Skew  
When the guest system (the VM) is being acquired it is 
critical for the incident response professional to record the 
time of the guest operating system as well as that of the 
host operating system. The time of the guest operating 
system could be skewed and if this is recorded the 
forensic examiner can make more definitive and accurate 
statements about activities that may have taken place. 
If the guest system clock is synchronized with the host 
system clock, the incident response professional should 
make sure to check if the host system time is correct else 
he should record the skew. If the guest is using an 
external source besides the host system clock to 
synchronize the time, any skew that exists should be 
recorded. The Forensics Snapshot Tool takes into account 
the time skew of the guest operating system to conduct 
analysis. 
 
3.2 Forensics Snapshot Analysis Tool 
 
With the acquired image from section 3.1, one can use 
open-source or commercial forensics tools, for example, 
EnCase, FTK, and Sleuthkit to conduct a forensics 
analysis. However, with the additional VM files created 
from the VM and features supported by VMware, are 
there other efficient techniques that could assist forensics 
investigation? 
VMware offers the Snapshot feature that allows one to 
freeze the state of a VM at a given point of time [18]. In 
this research, the authors developed a Forensics Snapshot 
Analysis tool that compares the snapshot with a pre-staged 
(recorded at an earlier time) snapshot to identify possible 
malicious activities.  
This tool is written as a Bash script and incorporates 
existing tools, such as Sleuthkit and md5sum, to verify 
the integrity of the evidence and also automate parts of 
the forensic analysis. The script extracts files from both 
the clean and the compromised image snapshots. Then a 
comparison is made to determine the changes detected - 
such as files created, changed or deleted. The tool is also 
capable of identifying MAC time changes, content 
changes and permission changes. These modified files are 
reported and can then be further investigated by a 
forensics examiner. 
To prove that the Forensics Snapshot Analysis tool is a 
forensically sound, the authors computed the MD5 
checksum of the image before and after applying this tool 
and found that the hash results are identical.  This 
validates that the tool does not modify the evidence files 
or their contents. 
 
4. EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS  
4.1 Experiment Setup 
Suspect virtual Machine:  
  
For our experiments, VMware Workstation 7.0.1 was 
installed on a Windows 7 Home Premium operating 
system with a New Technology File System (NTFS) 
partition. A Fedora 14 operating system was installed in 
VMware Workstation using an extended file system (ext), 
viz. ext3, with 10GB of disk space. Once the system was 
installed a snapshot was taken to establish a clean base 
system. Various packages were installed and changes to 
various files were made. Changes to file permissions such 
as execute bit, set user ID, etc. were also made to emulate 
a real world scenario where a malicious user might 
change file permissions to gain access to restricted parts 
of a system. Once these actions were performed, another 
snapshot of the VM was made. Since FTK Imager is a 
better solution to convert .vmdk and snapshot files to a 
completed raw image, we used FTK Imager to convert 
both the snapshots and create a raw disk images.   
Forensics Analysis Machine:  
Another Fedora 14 operating system was installed as a 
VM which was used for forensics analysis with the 
Forensics Snapshot Analysis Tool and its dependencies 
such as Sleuthkit and md5sum installed. 
 
4.2 Analysis and Results 
 
The experiment follows the processes shown in Figure 4.  
VM1: Suspect 
Machine
VM2: Forensics 
Analysis Machine
Setup: Various tool 
installation such as 
Sleuthkit, Autopsy, 
etc
Development of 
BASH script to 
analyze snapshots
Snapshot 1 
Created for a 
Clean Base Image
File changes made: 
Deletions, 
Additions, Edits, etc
Snapshot 2 Created 
for a unclean/
compromised  Image
FTK Image/
EnCase
raw/dd images of 
Snapshot 1 & 2
Analysis
Analysis 
results
VMware Workstation 7.0.1 
Install on Windows 7
 
Figure 4: Flow Chart of the processes  
As shown in Figure 5 below, the Forensics Snapshot 
Analysis tool successfully analyzes and compares 
snapshots of the same virtual machine taken at different 
points in time. Using the tool, a forensics examiner can 
generate a list of files that have been added, deleted, 
modified and changed by comparing the snapshots. The 
tool produces formatted reports of each analysis 
procedure it carries out. The forensics examiner can then 
decide on areas of further investigation based on the items 
of interest generated by the Forensics Snapshot Analysis 
tool. 
The Forensics Snapshot Analysis tool is forensically 
sound and does not modify the raw files in any way. This 
can be proven by computing the hashes of the raw files 
after analysis is complete. The MD5 & SHA1 hashed 
computed for the raw files after the tool has analyzed the 
raw files match the hashes computed before analysis was 
run. 
 
Figure 5: Output of Forensics Snapshot Analysis tool 
showing a list of recently deleted files 
4.3 Other usage of this tool 
 
This tool can also be used to study OS behavior.  One 
example would be inode reallocation. In some OSes, if a 
new file is created soon after deleting an existing file, the 
inode used by the deleted file is marked as “not in use” 
and could be assigned to a new file. This result can be 
seen from Figure 5 above when the file del_me.txt is 
deleted and added2.txt is created. The inode of file 
del_me2.txt is assigned to added2.txt. 
 
5. LIMITATIONS: POSSIBLE METHODS OF 
OBFUSCATION  
The Forensics Snapshot Analysis tool relies heavily on 
the MAC time of files to generate files of interest. A 
possible method for obfuscation could be the use of a tool 
that does not modify MAC times of files. TrueCrypt is 
one such tool. Depending on how the preferences are set, 
when a TrueCrypt volume is modified it can be 
configured to update only the change time, leaving the 
modification (mtime) and access (atime) times 
  
unchanged. The authors used TrueCrypt with their script 
to study this behavior of TrueCrypt and added features to 
the script which now checks for change time (ctime) 
difference between the files found in both snapshots. 
The Forensics Snapshot Analysis tool cannot view the 
contents of files that have been encrypted. The tool will 
still list files which have differing modification & change 
times but the examiner will not be able to view the 
contents of the file, if it is encrypted. A method to analyze 
encrypted files and volumes can be developed and 
incorporated in the tool. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK  
The authors studied the solutions for acquiring and 
analyzing live virtual machines based on VM files. A 
forensically sound procedure to acquire virtual disk 
images is provided. In addition, the snapshot analysis 
tool, Forensics Snapshot Analysis, was developed. It is a 
powerful tool for forensics investigators to analyze VM 
hard disk images and present pertinent evidence in court. 
This tool can also be useful in incident response to 
confirm a breach and to carry out further forensic 
analysis.  
The Forensics Snapshot Analysis tool can also be used for 
academic and training purposes. Students are taught that 
booting a suspect machine or VM that has been shutdown 
or suspended can modify the contents, changing potential 
evidence. Snapshots of a shutdown or suspended VM can 
be acquired before and after booting and these snapshots 
can be analyzed using the tool developed which will 
practically demonstrate why booting is not a forensically 
sound procedure. 
Several avenues can be pursued as an extension to this 
research. The effect of encrypted files and volumes on the 
analysis conducted by this tool can be studied further. 
Changes can be made to the developed tool to handle 
other file systems such as FAT, NTFS and other file 
systems.  
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